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Drawing the line somewhere: An experimental study of 
moral compromise. 
 
Abstract 
 
In a study by Shalvi, Dana, Handgraaf and De Dreu (2011) it was 
convincingly demonstrated that psychologically, the distinction between 
right and wrong is not discrete, rather it is a continuous distribution of 
relative ‘rightness’ and ‘wrongness’. Using the ‘die-under- the-cup’ 
paradigm participants over-reported high numbers on the roll of a die 
when there were financial incentives to do so and no chance of detection 
for lying. Participants generally did not maximize income, instead 
making moral compromises. In an adaptation of this procedure in a single 
die experiment 9% of participants lied that they had rolled a ‘6’ when 
they had not compared to 2.5% in the Shalvi et.al. study suggesting that 
when the incentive is donation to charity this encourages more 
dishonesty than direct personal gain. In a follow-up questionnaire study 
where sequences of three rolls were presented, lying increased where 
counterfactuals became available as predicted by Shalvi et.al.  A novel 
finding is reported where ‘justified’ lying is more common when 
comparative gains are higher.  
 
An investigation of individual differences revealed that economics 
students were much more likely to lie than psychology students. 
Relevance to research on tax evasion, corporate social responsibility and 
the ‘credit crunch’ is discussed. 
 
JEL Classification: A11,A12,D03,D6,H26. 
PsychInfo: 2340,3040. 
Keywords: Morals, Money, Compromises. 
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The decision of whether to lie or not in order to benefit financially is a 
process that has been the subject of extensive study. Allingham and 
Sandmo (1972) proposed rational economic man (REM) as a model of 
decision-making in the context of tax evasion. They argued that the 
decision to lie could be viewed as an economic calculation. However, the 
simplicity of the REM model has been criticised in more recent studies. 
Lewis, Carrera, Cullis and Jones (2009) highlighted the importance of 
cultural and individual differences in tax evasion. One explanation given 
for these variations is the differences in social norms which create formal 
and informal incentives for honesty. However, Fischbacher and Heusi 
(2008) conducted a study where no formal incentives for honesty existed 
and still participants abstained from lying. This suggests that social rules 
may become internalised or that individuals, in addition to wanting to 
appear favourable to others, also want to appear favourable to themselves 
(Bénabou and Tirole, 2002). Shalvi, Dana, Handgraaf and De Dreu 
(2011) found in their die-roll paradigm that the majority of participants 
did not lie in order to gain the maximum amount financially even when 
the detection rate was zero, however, participants did lie to some degree. 
Mazar, Amir and Ariely (2008) explain that the tendency to lie a little bit, 
but not as much as one possibly could, by proposing that people lie to 
some degree to increase their profit, but not so much as to threaten their 
positive self-concept as honest individuals.  
 
1.1. Justified ethicality 
 
One method of lying without threatening positive self-concept is to justify 
the lie. Kunda (1990) in a review of the relevant reasoning literature, 
argues that there is compelling evidence that people arrive at the 
conclusions they want to, that is by satisfying self interest, providing 
reasonable justifications for these conclusions are available. In an 
experimental manipulation Shalvi et al., (2011) studied justified ethicality 
by using a die-roll paradigm in which only the participant can see the 
outcome of the die roll and gain money according to the number on the 
die they state. The authors reported that the extent to which people 
allowed themselves to lie depended on the availability of self-
justifications that only they know about. When participants were allowed 
additional die rolls to verify the legitimacy of the die, they lied to a 
greater extent than participants with only one die roll and appeared to 
report the largest number they saw on any of the rolls even though they 
knew the subsequent rolls did not count for payment. Shalvi et al., (2011) 
proposed that people adjust their perception of what is, or is not, morally 
acceptable according to the availability of a self-justification for doing it. 
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They found that participants judged dishonest reports to be less dishonest 
when they are equal to one of the additional die rolls. This supports the 
idea by Hsee (1995), that ethical evaluations and subsequent behaviour 
are not perceived as a right versus wrong dichotomy but more as a 
continuum. 
 
1.2. Individual differences 
 
Krebs and Denton (2005) argued that whether moral reasoning is 
activated or not is determined by the moral issue itself, the context in 
which the moral issue is being considered combined with a variety of 
individual differences. This idea was furthered by Lewis et al., (2009) 
who claimed that individual differences can be explained by the 
interaction of three levels, first the individual level where the tendency to 
calculate in order to maximise net expected utility is a personal 
characteristic that some individuals will have and others will not. 
Secondly the social level which deals with how people are socialised 
differently, and finally, the importance of differences in cultural norms. 
Specifically Lewis et.al. (2009) showed the economics students compared 
to psychology students, men compared to women and Italian students 
compared to English students were more prone to cheating. 
 
1.3 Rationale  
 
Behavioural studies indicate that homo realitus, unlike homo economicus, 
favours moral compromise over wealth maximization . These moral 
compromises, reaching acceptable conclusions about ones own (bad, but 
not as bad as it could be) behaviour is influenced by the availability of 
justifications.The first study reported is a replication of the Shalvi et.al 
single-throw-hidden -die experiment with a twist: how might the results 
differ when the money earned is for charity rather than for oneself? Might 
this offer a justification for lying? 
 
The second study builds on the Shalvi et.al.(2011) hypothetical three roll 
study where it was shown that counterfactuals encourage justified lying. 
Kunda ( 1990)has made the case for the role of motivation in reasoning: 
could it be that justifications, are grasped with more enthusiasm when 
they represent greater comparative gain? 
 
Three rolls of the dice produces 216 sequences (6x6x6): both in the 
current study and the original, only a selection of these sequences was 
employed. 20 combinations were used in the current questionnaire as a 
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starting point for some speculative hypotheses. The selected 
combinations were chosen to address the following questions: 
 
Would honesty decrease when the first throw of 3 was low? ( i.e. where 
comparative gain is greater). 
 
Would ‘justified’ lying increase when there was a 6 in the sequence, (but 
not appearing first)? (i.e. where comparative gain is greatest) 
 
Are outright lies more common when no ‘suitable’ counterfactuals are 
available? (i.e. where roll numbers are lower than the original). 
 
Differences between participants studying Economics and Psychology 
and between males and females were also examined. Lewis et.al.(2009) 
have shown, in a questionnaire study of hypothetical tax returns , 
Economists and males are more likely to see it as a calculated gamble 
(and evade more) whereas Psychologists and females are more likely to 
see it as a moral issue (and evade less).Could it be that Economists and 
males are simply more likely to cheat? The three role questionnaire 
provides a test for the influence of degree choice and gender as well as 
the form the lying takes (i.e. whether or not it is justified by 
counterfactuals.). 
 
2. Method 
 
2.1. Design and materials 
 
A cross-sectional design was used, with a die-under-cup paradigm and 
self-report questionnaire. The questionnaire comprised 20, 3-die-roll 
sequences designed to assess the effects of throwing low scores first, 
throwing a 6 (but not first) and the effects of ‘unsuitable’ counterfactuals. 
Degree studied (whether Psychology or Economics) and gender was also 
recorded. 
 
2.2. Participants 
 
Opportunity sampling was used to recruit 94 students (34 Male and 60 
Female) from the University of Bath. The participants varied in their year 
of degree, 38 were Economics students and 56 were Psychology students. 
The average age was 19.82 years old and the standard deviation was 1.44. 
Participants were recruited by email, visiting lectures and seminars and 
through personal contacts. 
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2.3. Procedure 
 
The participants were asked to complete a consent form followed by 
standardised instructions being read to each participant individually (see 
Appendix 1). Participants were then asked to roll a die and earn money 
for Cancer Research UK according to what they reported rolling. The die 
was placed under a plastic cup that had a small hole in the top, 
participants had to shake the cup to roll the die and then look through the 
hole to see what was rolled (Fischbacher & Heusi, 2008; Shalvi, et al., 
2011) (see Figure 1). This assured the participants that only they would 
know the result. After rolling the die the participants were asked to state 
the number they rolled and then they were asked to roll the die again to 
check its legitimacy and to ensure no one else would know what number 
they rolled after they had left the experiment. They were then given the 
corresponding amount of money in 10p pieces (1 = 10p, 2 = 20p etc) to 
their stated die roll to put in the charity box. The participants were then 
asked to complete the questionnaire (Appendix 2). A delayed debriefing 
via email was administered one week after the experiment was 
completed, this was to prevent participants from discussing the 
experiment with classmates who had yet to do the experiment.  
 
4. Results and Discussion 
 
In the single throw die-under-cup study a one sample Kolmogorov-
Smirnov Z test was used to assess whether the recorded throws produced 
a distribution which was significantly different from a uniform 
distribution of a fair die (Z= 2.37, p< 0.001. As Figure 2 reveals this 
significant result was due to an under-reporting , in particular, of ‘1’s and 
‘2’s and a over-reporting of ‘6’s. This differs from the result to Shalvi 
et.al. single roll condition (Z=1.16, ns ). In the current study 24.5% of the 
participants said they rolled a ‘6’ where a fair roll would produce a figure 
of 17%. So the difference between these figures is the proportion of 
people who lied about rolling a ‘6’. Fischbacher and Heusi (2008) have 
argued that this figure should be multiplied by 6/5 to take into account 
participants who actually threw a ‘6’ but would have lied had they thrown 
a lower number. Therefore the calculation of ‘6’ roll liars is (24.5%-
17%)6/5 = 9%. This is considerably higher than the Shalvi et.al. result of 
2.5% for a single throw. A plausible explanation for this difference is that 
making contributions to a cancer charity rather than direct personal gain 
provides a justification for lying. This could be similar to what Gino and 
Pierce (2010) have termed the ‘Robin Hood effect’ although as the 
researchers supplied the funds themselves it is hardly a case of stealing 
from the rich to give to the poor. An alternative, or perhaps inter-rated 
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explanation, is that the relatively trivial amounts in the current study, a 
maximum of 60p(1$) compared to 6$ in the Shalvi et.al. study , made the 
lie more morally acceptable and the liars less uncomfortable. 
 
The second part of the study comprised hypothetical three rolls of the die. 
Across the 20 questions, 73% of responses were honest, 16% were 
‘justified’ lies and  9 % were out-and-out lies i.e.without counterfactual 
justification ( only 2% answered in a way that suggested  they did not 
understand what they were being asked to do).  
 
As anticipated, honesty was tested most when the first roll was a ‘1’ 
where the sequence 1,3,6, produced 33% ‘justified’ lies and 1,5,6, 30%. 
 
‘Justified’ lying increased when there was a ‘6’ in the sequence (but not 
occurring first ) e.g. 1,3,6 (33% lied); 4,5,6,( 32%); 1,5,6, (30%). 
 
Taken as a whole these three results support Shalvi et.al.’s finding that 
counterfactuals increase lying. What is new is that particular 
counterfactual combinations appear to encourage lying more than others 
i.e. where comparative gains are higher. 
 
Were outright lies more common when no ‘suitable’ counterfactuals were 
available? The answer appears to be ‘yes’. For the sequence 1,1,1, 18% 
were outright lies and for 3,3,3, 13% were outright lies. 
 
Turning to individual differences next a mixed ANOVA (General Liner 
Model) was used to ascertain whether mean dice scores differed between 
Economists and Psychologists and between males and females across the 
twenty combinations. Degree course proved to be highly significant (F= 
13.2,p< 0.001); the effects for gender and the gender/degree interaction 
were both insignificant (F = 0.38,F= 2.69).Of the twenty comparisons 
(one for each question) Economists reported significantly higher dice 
scores on 12 occasions ; the remaining 8 ‘t’ tests were insignificant (for 
all the ‘t’ results see Table 5.) 
 
Table 1 presents the proportion of honest responses to justified lies and 
outright lies for Economists compared to Psychologists. A significant chi 
square figure of  161.1, d.f.=2, p< 0.001 revealed that while Psychologists 
are no saints, Economists are more likely to lie (both outright lies and 
‘justified’ lies ) and are less likely to be honest.  
 
This interpretation requires elaboration as Table 2 reveals that males are 
less honest (Chi square 41.4,df =2, p< 0.001). In our sample there were 
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more male economists than female economists and more female 
psychologists than male psychologists. Two further chi square tests were 
undertaken to assess whether the main effect is due to degree choice or 
gender. Table 3 shows that for males, degree choice is significant (Chi 
square 154.5, df = 2, p < 0.001) but not for females (Chi square 5.1, df 
=2, n.s.). Comparing tables 3 and 4 it can be seen that honesty among 
male and female psychologists is very similar whereas there is tendency 
for female economists to be more honest than male economists. 
Increasing the number of male psychologists would have little effect on 
the overall result, whereas increasing the number of females in the 
economics sample may marginally decrease the significance of the degree 
choice effect. With this caveat it can be concluded that degree choice is 
the dominant effect. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The one throw die-in-the-cup method neatly demonstrates willingness to 
make moral compromises. For some people there are occasions when 
lying can be justified e.g. where gains are for charity rather than personal 
gain. The hypothetical three die roll study demonstrates not only that 
available (and suitable) counterfactuals increase ‘justified’ lying, but also 
that ‘justified’ lying in more common where comparative gains are higher 
i.e. where the incentives are more pronounced. Furthermore it has been 
shown that outright lies are more common where there are no suitable 
counterfactuals.  
 
At the level of individual differences it has been demonstrated that 
Economists are more willing to cheat. This is of some concern given that 
people with economics degrees hold prominent positions in financial 
institutions: might this undermine effective corporate social responsibility 
policies and the avoidance of another ‘credit crunch’ ?(Lewis,2010). 
 
In the context of tax compliance the results suggest that people are 
generally honest and pay their taxes without taking into account the 
chances of detection (unless they are economists) and when they evade 
they do so in ‘justified’ ways which do not maximise their income. In a 
country like the U.K. where voluntary tax compliance is high this is not 
major problem: it remains to be seen whether respondents say they throw 
more 6’s in countries where tax compliance is poor e.g. Italy. If the 
authorities wanted to collect more revenue should they target people with 
economics degrees? There is always the problem that more authoritative 
zeal can lead to more resistance. 
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A systematic analysis of the three roll experiment and the invitation to lie 
may constitute a useful extension of this work, nevertheless it must be 
remembered that the willingness to lie is contextual and it has been 
demonstrated here for example that the form of financial incentives 
makes a difference.  
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Appendix 1: Script for die-roll-paradigm 
 
To the experimenter: 
 
 Thank the participant for coming. 
 Get them to sign the consent form and explain about the delayed debrief by email. 
 Say it is a two-part experiment comprising a die roll game and a questionnaire. 
 
Tell the participants the following: 
 
 The first part of the experiment is a die roll game. 
 You need to roll the die once under the cup. 
 There is a hole on top of the cup that allows you to see what number you have 
rolled. 
 There is no way that I can see or know what number you have rolled. 
 One you have rolled the die look through the hole on top of the cup and state the 
number you have rolled. 
 The number that you roll corresponds to the amount of money we (the 
experimenters) will donate to Cancer Research UK on your behalf. Rolling a 1 = 10p, 
2 = 20p etc. 
 Once you have stated the number, roll the dice another two times to check the 
legitimacy of the die and get rid of the number you have rolled so we have no way of 
checking. 
 Now if you could complete the questionnaire that would be great. 
 
To the experimenter: 
 
 Thank the participant again. 
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Appendix 2 : Questionnaire 
 
Thank you for helping us with our research. The information you provide is completely 
confidential and there are no ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ answers to the questions posed. You are free 
to omit any questions you do not feel comfortable answering. 
 
Please ring your answer to the following questions in terms of what you would do in these 
situations. 
 
 
 
Imagine you roll a die three times: the die cannot and will not be seen by anyone else. The 
amount you roll on the first throw determines the amount you are paid in pounds by the 
experimenter (roll a 1 and receive £1, 2 = £2 etc.), the second and third throws are just to 
check the legitimacy of the die but do not count for payment. 
 
1. You roll a 1, 3 and 6, what do you state as the number for payment: 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
 
2. You roll a 6, 3 and 4, what do you state as the number rolled for payment: 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
 
3. You roll a 3, 6 and 6, what do you state as the number rolled for payment: 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
 
4. You roll a 2, 5 and 4, what do you state as the number rolled for payment: 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
 
5. You roll a 1, 1 and 1, what do you state as the number rolled for payment: 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
 
6. You roll a 3, 6 and 1, what do you state as the number rolled for payment: 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
 
7. You roll a 1, 5 and 4, what do you state as the number rolled for payment: 
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1  2  3  4  5  6 
 
8. You roll a 4, 3 and 5, what do you state as the number rolled for payment: 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
 
9. You roll a 5, 2 and 2, what do you state as the number rolled for payment: 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
 
10. You roll a 5, 6 and 6, what do you state as the number rolled for payment: 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
 
11. You roll a 1, 5 and 6, what do you state as the number rolled for payment: 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
 
12. You roll a 2, 5 and 1, what do you state as the number rolled for payment: 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
 
13. You roll a 3, 2 and 6, what do you state as the number rolled for payment: 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
 
14. You roll a 4, 1 and 5, what do you state as the number rolled for payment: 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
 
15. You roll a 1, 1 and 3, what do you state as the number rolled for payment: 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
 
16. You roll a 2, 6 and 2, what do you state as the number rolled for payment: 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
 
17. You roll a 4, 5 and 6, what do you state as the number rolled for payment: 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
 
18. You roll a 1, 1 and 1, what do you state as the number rolled for payment: 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
 
19. You roll a 3, 3 and 3, what do you state as the number rolled for payment: 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
 
20. You roll a 3, 6 and 4, what do you state as the number rolled for payment: 
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1  2  3  4  5  6 
 
 
Please supply the following pieces of information about yourself: 
 
Degree Programme: 
Year of Study : 
Age: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Honesty, Lying and Degree Choice  
 
 
 
Honesty Justified Lying Outright Lying 
 
Psychologists 85%* 9% 6% 
 
Economists 59% 28% 13% 
 
 
* Rounded percentages. All Chi Square calculations are from raw scores. 
 
Chi Square 161.2, d.f. = 2 , p< 0.001 
 
 
 
Table 2: Honesty, Lying and Gender 
 
 Honesty 
 
Justified Lying Outright Lying 
Male 
 
67% 19% 14% 
Female 
 
79% 16% 6% 
 
Chi Square 41.4, d.f. =2, p< 0.001 
 
 
Table(s)
Table 3: Males only:  Honesty, Lying and Degree Choice. 
 
 Honesty 
 
Justified Lying Outright Lying 
Psychologists 
 
92% 3% 5% 
Economists 
 
48% 30% 23% 
 
Chi Square 154.5, d.f. =2, p< 0.001 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Females only:  Honesty, Lying and Degree Choice. 
 
 Honesty 
 
Justified Lying Outright Lying 
Psychologists 
 
82% 11% 6% 
Economists 
 
68% 27% 6% 
 
Chi Square 5.1, d.f. =2, n.s. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table(s)
Table 5: A table to show the mean dice roll given by both psychologists 
and economists for each of the twenty hypothetical dice-roll questions 
 
 
 
Sequence Degree 
Programme 
Mean t p 
Q1. 1-3-6 Psych 1.68 4.2 .001 
Eco 3.32 
Q2. 6-3-4  Psych 5.88 1.8 n.s. 
Eco 5.53 
Q3. 3-6-6 Psych 3.54 3.24 .002 
Eco 4.42 
Q4. 2-5-4 Psych 2.46 3.38 .001 
Eco 3.45 
Q5. 1-1-1 Psych 1.21 2.0 n.s. 
Eco 1.76 
Q6. 3-6-1 Psych 3.30 2.68 n.s. 
Eco 3.97 
Q7. 1-5-4 Psych 1.80 3.1 .003 
 Eco 3.00 
Q8. 4-3-5 Psych 4.13 1.77 n.s. 
Eco 4.39 
Q9. 5-2-2 Psych 4.93 0.87 n.s. 
Eco 4.76 
Q10. 5-6-6 Psych 5.09 3.69 .001 
Eco 5.42 
Q11. 1-5-6 Psych 1.86 4.7 .001 
Eco 3.74 
Q12. 2-5-1 Psych 2.43 3.42 .001 
Eco 3.42 
Q13. 3-2-6 Psych 3.27 3.41 .001 
Eco 4.16 
Q14. 4-1-5 Psych 4.09 1.59 n.s. 
Eco 4.34 
Q15. 1-1-3 Psych 1.52 2.86 .006 
Eco 2.45 
Q16. 2-6-2 Psych 2.57 2.92 .005 
Eco 3.58 
Q17. 4-5-6 Psych 4.30 3.16 .002 
Eco 4.84 
Q18. 1-1-1 Psych 1.52 0.84 n.s. 
Eco 1.76 
Q19. 3-3-3 Psych 3.25 0.83 n.s. 
Eco 3.39 
Q20. 3-6-4 Psych 3.36 3.47 .001 
Eco 4.24 
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Figure 1: Die-in-the-cup procedure 
 
 
   
Figure(s)
Figure 2: The frequency and percentage of die rolls stated by all the 
participants compared to the average frequency of 16. 
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